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The Scotland Bill contains proposals based on the 
Calman Report 
1
to remedy the major financial weakness 
of the 1997 devolution settlement – namely its limited 
tax-raising powers
2
.   (The new funding model will 
combine Block Grant with new tax revenues from a 
Scottish Income Tax, a Scottish Land Transaction Tax 
and a Scottish Landfill Tax.  However, it has been 
heavily criticised by the Scottish Government for having 
a “long-term deflationary bias”
3
 . 
 
This is a strong attack on a model intended to 
maintain stability and promote accountability in 
devolution finance.  The current approach is 
embedded in the UK fiscal framework, in which the 
UK Government has responsibility for the planning 
and control of the public finances, and resource 
allocation to UK Departments and Devolved 
Administrations.  The Scottish Budget therefore 
benefits from 
 
“an automatic macroeconomic stabilisation 
level and a public expenditure per capita 
substantially above the UK average”
4
. 
 
The UK Budget process provides a high degree of 
stability.  It operates through incremental change, in 
which the major part of the new budget is the 
existing baseline, and decisions are made around 
the margins of this budget base.  In the case of the 
Scottish Budget, incremental adjustments are made 
through the Barnett Formula which delivers the 
same per capita increase/decrease as comparable 
UK programmes, and has delivered “stability and 
predictability” since devolution”
5
. 
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Fiscal reform 
The Bill states that the new model will create a 
system which will allow the Scottish Parliament to 
determine how revenues are raised to supplement 
its existing responsibility to determine how budgets 
are spent, and be accountable for those choices.  It 
creates a degree of risk over revenue receipts, but 
will have borrowing powers to manage this flow of 
resources  As the majority of funding will still be 
provided by a Block Grant, stability and 
predictability will be maintained.  These plans will 
operate within the UK fiscal framework which will 
allow the Treasury to retain aggregate control 
“consistent with the continuing reservation of overall 
macroeconomic policy”
6
. 
 
So the Scottish Budget will now have two revenue 
streams, from its “own revenues” and from a 
smaller Block Grant, calculated as at present, but 
reduced by the amount of anticipated revenues. 
 
Initially, the tax revenues will be forecast and 
assigned to the Scottish Budget in a transparent 
way to show how much grant is being replaced by 
taxation, based on the current levels generated by 
10p tax rate across all bands. 
 
The full system is planned to be implemented by 
2016.  Firstly, the minor taxes will be introduced in 
2015, with the new revenue borrowing powers of 
£200 million per annum, up to a £500 million limit, to 
manage any deficits from revenue shortfall, whilst 
surpluses can be retained in a new Scottish cash 
reserve for offsetting any deficits in future years. 
 
In 2016, the main UK rates will be reduced by 10p 
for Scottish taxpayers, and the Scottish Parliament 
will set a replacement tax necessary to balance its 
Budget.  There will then be a permanent reduction 
of Block Grant.   
 
If there is an outturn deficit of less than 0.5%, the 
Parliament will be expected to absorb this in the 
Budget. Any borrowing can fund shortfalls for up to 
four years.  Any shortfalls or surpluses arising from 
forecasting errors will be dealt with by transfers 
between the Scottish Budget and the UK 
Consolidated Fund. 
 
 
The Scottish Government’s response 
In the Scottish Government’s view, the new model 
will “generate greater volatility in future budgets” 
and result in “UK cuts by the back door”, as they 
expect tax receipts to grow more slowly than the 
Block Grant, thereby reducing the Scottish Budget.  
Therefore 
 
“we estimate that these proposals would 
have cost Scotland £8 billion since 1999”
7
.  
 
Secondly, they claim it leaves Scotland exposed to 
the impact of changes to UK tax policy even though 
a detriment provision will prevent any loss of 
resources, which has been a key principle of 
devolution since 1999. 
 
Thirdly, it regards the revenue borrowing powers as 
insufficient to manage revenue volatility.  Overall, it 
sees the proposals as a “backward step” which 
“could make the spending and economic challenges 
Scotland faces more difficult”.  
 
This is a contentious interpretation of the financial 
impact of the Bill.  The cumulative shortfall of £8 
billion exaggerates the financial impact of the new 
system on the Budget.  This Government uses this 
practice regularly in presenting spending plans and 
efficiency savings, or in forecasting future 
allocations. 
 
More importantly, it is inappropriate when seeking 
to assess the financial impact of the new tax powers 
on the Scottish Budget.  What matters is the 
stability of annual budgets and the capacity of the 
borrowing powers to cope with any volatility in the 
revenue stream. 
 
The Scottish Government’s estimate of the additive 
shortfall since devolution is £1.2 billion, or £109 
million per annum on average.  However, specific 
years can exceed this average and could be a 
concern.  Fortunately, the Scottish Government’s 
revenue estimates are significantly lower than the 
official estimates from HMRC. 
 
The Finance Minister advised the Scottish 
Parliament (Official Report, 14/1/2011, col.157) that 
his Government’s position had been strongly 
influenced by an academic paper by Professors 
Hughes-Hallet and Scott.  This paper reports 
broadly similar conclusions, and the academics 
have since gone on record in The Scotsman of 14th 
January 2011 as supporting the Scottish 
Government’s position, and that their cumulative 
shortfall assessment figures which they see as 
economically damaging (and indeed also use the 
term “deflationary bias”), is based on Scottish 
Government data
8
. 
 
The Scottish Government’s estimate of the yield 
from a 10p tax rate is that on average, it is 15% of 
the Departmental Expenditure Limit.  This is based 
on data in Government Expenditure and Revenues 
in Scotland, but GERS only provides an estimate of 
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total yield.  Their note does not illustrate how the 
15% figure was reached, and also excludes 
revenues from the other taxes. 
 
The official estimates, provided by HMRC, are 
much higher, at 17.25% over the same period, with 
a range from 14.6% to 20.2%.  Table 1 compares 
the annual estimates of the Scottish Government 
with the official statistics on which the reforms will 
be based, and shows the official estimates are 
consistently higher, and add to a total of around £1 
billion more than the Scottish Government’s 
estimates between 1999 and 2007.  This would 
result in a modest total shortfall of around £200 
million, not £1.2 billion. 
 
This suggests that the volatility will be much less 
than the Scottish Government assumed, but the 
range of scores from 14.6% to 20.2% is wide 
enough to create concerns over the degree of 
volatility in revenues and the intention to use an 
average figure for the permanent adjustment to the 
Block Grant. 
 
This could be overcome, however, by continuing the 
practice of forecasting and assigning the tax 
revenues to the Scottish Budget as intended during 
the transition.  The UK Government objective is to 
increase the Parliament’s financial powers and to 
link the Scottish Budget more closely to Scottish tax 
revenues.  It is not its purpose to change Scotland’s 
share of UK funding, but to increase choice at the 
margins. With two funding streams, however, there 
could be changes to the Budget, compared with the 
Barnett model, in any year.  Now the changes will 
depend on the tax decisions of the Parliament and 
the performance of the economy. 
 
The Bill acknowledges that the new tax powers give 
the Parliament “an interest in the economy” (i.e. to 
increase its tax yield).  In the Scottish Parliament, 
the major division was over the lack of economic 
levers to influence growth.  The Bill Committee’s 
report
9
 reflects the conflicting evidence over the 
causal link between fiscal devolution and economic 
growth.  The report quotes several economic 
experts expressing scepticism over the Scottish 
Government’s economic arguments.  These 
included views that economic growth is driven 
mainly by factors other than taxes and spending, 
and that the fiscal powers should lead to better 
governance, which might lead to improved growth 
later. 
 
This is a combination of empirical and theoretical 
arguments.  The evidence on fiscal causality has 
been examined extensively, but “better governance” 
is a slippery concept.  The Committee draws on this 
substantive body of evidence to reject the case 
made by Scottish Minister’s for full fiscal autonomy, 
on the grounds that “the overwhelming balance of 
expert opinion” did not find any causal link between 
fiscal devolution and growth (paragraph 36). 
 
The Committee then appears to adopt a 
contradictory position over the grant reduction 
mechanism in that “it should not insulate the 
Scottish Budget from the performance of the 
Scottish economy, so that the Scottish Parliament 
has a direct financial stake in Scotland’s economic 
success!” (paragraph 74). 
 
Politicians may be unwilling to publicly acknowledge 
their inability to influence economic growth under 
the devolution settlement.  It is certainly the case 
that growth was heavily influenced by the growth of 
public spending between 1999 and 2005
10
, but that 
simply reflects UK budgetary strategy. 
 
The problem remains that the new model could 
result in a smaller Budget even if the Scottish 
Parliament simply maintained tax revenues as they 
are at present.  This would blur the clear lines of 
accountability for tax decisions. 
 
Implementation can be achieved without the need 
for a permanent adjustment to the Block Grant, thus 
maintaining stability.  For the initial period, the 
intention is to deduct forecast revenues from the 
Block Grant total to provide a required level of 
grant, adjusted for any variation in tax levels, the tax 
revenues will then be assigned to the Scottish 
Budget. 
 
This model could simply continue, removing the 
need for a permanent adjustment of the Block Grant 
based on average revenues as a proportion of the 
DEL.  This would also remove the need for 
borrowing powers, the Block Grant will continue to 
be set by Barnett, minus the forecast revenues, and 
there would be no shortfall/surpluses on the Budget 
because of volatility in revenues. 
 
Put more simply, the Scottish Budget would 
continue to have a full Barnett-based spending 
assessment, funded by assigned tax revenues and 
a reduced Block Grant.  This would remove the 
volatility problem, and maintain our relative position 
in UK allocations, and only vary when tax decisions 
are taken to do so.  
 
This approach would better meet the UK 
Government’s objective “to ensure that the relative 
levels of public expenditure remain constant”
11
.  The 
Scottish Budget’s share of UK funding would remain 
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stable, with any budget variations reflected in higher 
or lower taxes on Scottish taxpayers. 
 
Conclusions 
The Scotland Bill will increase the financial 
accountability of the Scottish Parliament by 
requiring tax levels to be set annually to balance the 
Scottish Budget, and to vary the Budget according 
to its political preferences by increasing or 
decreasing spending and taxation at the margins.  
The Scottish Budget will remain within the UK fiscal 
framework. 
 
Whilst the new funding mechanism will create a 
degree of volatility in tax revenues, this will not 
result in the deflationary bias as suggested by the 
Scottish Government.  Their estimating errors and 
practice of cumulative accounting greatly 
exaggerate the financial impact of the Bill on the 
Scottish Budget. 
 
The degree of volatility is much less, and can be 
dealt with within the UK fiscal framework by 
maintaining the practice of forecasting and 
assigning revenues to the Scottish Budget, whilst 
reducing the Block Grant accordingly from the 
conventional Barnett spending assessment.  This 
would remove the need for a permanent adjustment 
to the Block Grant, and for revenue borrowing 
powers.  This would meet the Calman principles of 
autonomy, accountability and equity within the 
principles of the Union and Treasury management 
of the public finances. 
 
This would operate in the same way as the grant 
system in local government.  Barnett would 
continue to determine Scotland’s appropriate share 
of the UK Budget.  That figure would then be 
adjusted to reflect the tax yield set in Edinburgh.  A 
reduction from 10p would reduce the allocation, 
whilst an increase above 10p would increase 
spending. 
 
The Scottish tax decision would determine the total 
budget available, whilst Barnett would retain our 
relative position and provide funding stability.  
Accountability would therefore be increased and the 
constitutional objectives met. 
 
 
Table 1: Comparative estimates of 10p tax yield in Scotland Bill 
 
 
Year 
Scottish 
Government 
£million 
 
HMRC 
£million 
 
1999-2000 
 
2651 
 
2600 
2000-1 2898 2980 
2001-2 3018 3130 
2002-3 3098 3210 
2003-4 3207 3310 
2004-5 3427 3510 
2005-6 3746 3930 
2006-7 4073 4260 
2007-8 4394 4570 
 
Total 30572 31560 
  
 
____________________ 
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